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Brammer: Challenge Accepted: A Reconsideration of Regulatory Takings Juris

CHALLENGE ACCEPTED: A RECONSIDERATION OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Joe Brammer*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is no bold assertion to suggest that the Supreme Court has
established a tradition of asking the wrong question when ascertaining
which unenumerated rights the Constitution protects.1 In doing so, the
Court necessarily constrains itself to fashioning a square-peg solution
for the round-hole issue confronting it.2 This square-peg typically takes
the form of a contrived test, purportedly articulate and dynamic, but
usually smacking of “ad-hockery.”3 Often, the Court arrives at the right
answer despite asking the wrong question and further delays a necessary
and long-overdue restructuring of the framework with which it
enumerates “fundamental” rights. Its failure to undertake this effort
threatens to accelerate the pace with which state and federal
governments erode the individual liberty interests that the Constitution,
properly interpreted, protects.
This Article briefly explores the Supreme Court’s June 2017 decision
in Murr v. Wisconsin. The Murr court asked the wrong question and
expanded, rather than discarded, the Takings Clause analysis used to
determine whether so-called “regulatory takings” are unconstitutional.
More importantly, this Article accepts the challenge Justice Thomas
presents in his Murr dissent: to “reconsider” the Court’s regulatory
takings precedent.4 Part II examines the both the history preceding the
drafting of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Clause’s subsequent application in constitutional
jurisprudence. Part III summarizes the evolution of American
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thanks are owed to
Professor Christopher Bryant, whose enthusiasm for constitutional interpretation was the inspiration for
this comment, and to my wife, Kelly, without whose support I could not have accomplished this
undertaking.
1. See generally Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485
(2017) (determining the appropriate inquires required of an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution’s text).
2. Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due
Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 834 (2003) (describing the Court’s application
of substantive due process analyses to issues presenting different legal claims).
3. Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin
Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017).
4. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

1299

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 5

1300

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

conceptions of property rights and the development of regulatory
takings precedent, beginning with the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon and culminating in Murr v. Wisconsin. Part IV asks
the correct question—whether the right to dispose of individual property
is a privilege of citizenship protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. The question itself is
narrow, its implications far-reaching.
II. THOMAS, MCDONALD, AND THE SLAUGHTER OF PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES
To understand why the Murr majority answered the wrong question,
we must first accept Justice Thomas’ invitation to consider whether the
proper inquiry lies in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Murr, the majority found that a Wisconsin
statute prohibiting a property owner from selling a portion of his land
did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.5 Their analysis
applied the regulatory takings doctrine, which the Court had developed
over the previous century in cases where no physical appropriation of
property occurred.6 Chief Justice Roberts authored the main dissent and
criticized the majority’s “malleable definition of ‘private property’” that
allowed courts to consider factors beyond state defined property
boundaries in their analyses.7 Justice Thomas wrote separately and
agreed that the dissent properly applied the regulatory takings precedent
to the facts of the case.8 However, he questioned whether the doctrine
itself was constitutional and suggested that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may provide a better answer to the
regulatory takings question.9
If Justice Thomas is correct and the Clause is the proper lens through
which to examine the issue, it is because the Clause protects a
substantive right to dispose of property, guaranteed to every American
citizen, that no State may abridge. Justice Thomas provided the
framework for this inquiry in his concurring opinion in McDonald v.
City of Chicago, described in the section below. After examining his
framework, this part of the Article summarizes American conceptions of
individual property rights at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. It then proceeds with an analysis of historical
understandings of the privileges and immunities of American
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1950.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
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citizenship.
A. Justice Thomas, McDonald, and the Meaning of “Privileges or
Immunities”
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Thomas took issue with
Court for arriving at the right answer—that Chicago’s ordinance
effectively banning handgun ownership violated the Fourteenth
Amendment—by asking the wrong question.10 While he agreed that the
Fourteenth Amendment did make the Second Amendment applicable to
the States, he persuasively argued that it was the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not its Due Process
Clause, that supported the Court’s holding.11 His objection to the
substantive due process doctrine that the plurality employed echoed his
dissent in Murr—that the Court would be better served to ground its
protection of substantive liberty interests in a clause that speaks to
substance, not process.12
Unlike in Murr, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in McDonald included
a thorough examination of the Fourteenth Amendment’s history. This
examination supported his assertion that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Amendment prohibited States from abridging the
fundamental rights enumerated in the Second Amendment.13 His
opinion initially contextualized the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption
among the numerous legislative efforts to remedy the injustices of
slavery. Specifically, the Amendment’s first sentence, granting
citizenship to former slaves “unambiguously overruled” the Dred Scott
decision.14 Next, Justice Thomas examined the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and found that its purpose, facially at least, was to grant those
slaves now enjoying citizenship a body of associated rights
encompassed within their new status.15 It was the Court’s narrow
10. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
11. Id. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment has three distinct clauses. Its first clause
grants citizenship to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States.” This was a direct
repudiation of the infamous Dred Scott decision that denied black Americans citizenship, both in their
own state and the United States. Id. at 808. Second, is the Privileges or Immunities Clause which
prohibits state abridgement of certain individual rights. Disagreement over exactly which rights this
clause refers to has generated a quagmire of jurisprudence that Justice Thomas’ McDonald dissent
sought to resolve. Third, is the Due Process Clause. Its text makes the Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions
against unjust deprivations of “life, liberty, and property” directly applicable to the states while
additionally forbidding states from denying their citizens “the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 807.
15. Id. at 808.
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definition of this body articulated in the Slaughter-House Cases,
described in more detail below, that rendered the Privileges or
Immunities Clauses meaningless in modern constitutional jurisprudence,
giving rise to the substantive due process doctrine.16
To establish why the Slaughter-House Cases were wrong, Justice
Thomas explained why that Court’s interpretation of the Constitution’s
text was incorrect. Presuming that its drafters intended the Clause to
have meaning and effect, Justice Thomas then embarked on a journey to
“discern what ‘ordinary citizens’” in 1868 would have understood the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean.17 Citing contemporary
precedent, he characterized “privileges” and “immunities” as
synonymous with “rights,” “liberties,” and “freedoms” incident to
American citizenship during Reconstruction.18 Having so defined these
terms, he then asserted that the purpose of the government, both state
and federal, was to protect these rights.19 Justice Thomas relied upon
contemporary sources and found that Justice Bushrod Washington’s
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell (described in further detail below) best
described which enumerated rights were privileges and immunities of
American citizenship.20
To support his argument, Justice Thomas recounted Sen. Jacob
Howard’s speech before the Senate introducing the most recent draft of
the Amendment. Sen. Howard clarified that the Amendment’s purpose
was to prohibit the States from “abridging the privileges and immunities
of the United States.”21 As to what rights these “privileges and
immunities” encompassed, Sen. Howard cited Corfield v. Coryell as the
authoritative description.22 Relevant to the focus of this Article, Justice
Thomas
also
compared
contemporary
Reconstruction-era
characterizations of the substantive rights contained in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause with those described in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which guaranteed that “citizens, of every race and color” enjoyed a right
to “the security of person and property,” again finding that
Reconstruction definitions of “privileges” mirrored the Corfield
definition.23
16. Id. at 808-810.
17. Id. at 813 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”)).
18. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 813-814 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing several nineteenth century
cases defining the terms consistent with the Blackstonian interpretation that informed antebellum
Constitutional jurisprudence).
19. Id. at 815.
20. Id. at 820.
21. Id. at 831-832.
22. Id. (citing 39th CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2765 (1866)).
23. Id. at 833, quoting §1, 14 Stat. 27.
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After devoting more than half of his opinion discerning the meaning
of the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Thomas
identified and answered two crucial questions. First, did the “ratifying
public” understand the right to keep and bear arms described in the
Second Amendment to be a privilege of American citizenship that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected?24 Unequivocally, he argued, they
did.25 Having answered this threshold question, he then determined
whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited Chicago from abridging
this right or did it merely require that the city impose any restrictions
upon its exercise in a non-discriminatory manner.26 His answer to this
question was similarly confident—“[t]he Clause is thus best understood
to impose a limitation on state power to infringe upon pre-existing
substantive rights.” 27
For Justice Thomas, the Court delivered the correct answer to the
wrong question.28 The continued adherence of the plurality to the
substantive due process doctrine perpetuated a century-old methodology
that was “devoid of a guiding principle.”29 The ordinance was
unconstitutional because it abridged a privilege of American citizenship
“include[d] in the minimum baseline of federal rights” that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected.30 Whatever protections the
Due Process Clause of that same Amendment guaranteed had nothing to
do with the issue presented.31 Commentators critical of the substantive
24. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837-838 (Thomas, J., concurring). The emphasis Justice Thomas
places on discerning what the “ratifying public” understood the text to mean reflects the division among
adherents of originalist constitutional interpretation. A minority of originalist scholars and judges favor
“intentional meaning originalism” and believe the proper inquiry concerns what the drafters of the
Constitution’s text intended that text to mean. After enduring widespread and valid criticism, originalists
have largely embraced “public-meaning originalism” which focuses instead on the “more-readily
accessible original conventional meaning of the text . . ., rather than individual or group intent.” See
Strang, Lee J., How Big Data Can Increase Originalism's Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus
Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2017)
(examining the evolution of originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation).
25. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 838.
27. Id. at 839. Justice Thomas found support for his “natural textual reading” from a proposed
revision that President Johnson submitted to Congress after some Southern states refused to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment. The revision eliminated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, removing the
language “[n]o State shall” and “abridge,” and replaced it with language guaranteeing that the “Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the several States.” This revision
was an attempt to replicate the language of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution. This proposed
change, according to Justice Thomas, demonstrated that the “ratifying public” understood the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Amendment to be a prohibition against the infringement of fundamental
liberty interests rather than an anti-discrimination provision ensuring only that States equally apply any
law infringing upon these interests. Id. at 839-840.
28. Id. at 805.
29. Id. at 812.
30. Id. at 858.
31. Id. at 805.
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due process doctrine regarded Justice Thomas’s dissent as rallying cry,
providing a remedy to the damage they believed the doctrine inflicts
upon the body of constitutional jurisprudence.32
B. Historical Interpretations of the Privileges of Citizenship
For Justice Thomas, and many others who believe the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to be the true source of protection for substantive
rights, Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion has been the most cogent
articulation of the rights embodied in the “privileges and immunities” of
citizenship.33 In Corfield, a citizen of Pennsylvania challenged the
constitutionality of New Jersey’s law preventing non-citizens from
raking oysters in New Jersey’s oyster beds.34 After dismissing the
plaintiff’s claim that New Jersey violated Article I, §8 (the Commerce
Clause), Justice Washington then considered whether the law violated
Article IV, §2 (the Privileges and Immunities Clause).35 He framed the
issue as such:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious
than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety. . . .36
The key distinction was whether the right to take New Jersey oysters
was fundamental, belonging to the “citizens of all free governments,” or
whether it was a “public benefit[] [that] a State might choose to make

32. See A. Christopher Bryant, What McDonald Means for Unenumerated Rights, 45 GA. L.
REV. 1073, 1074 (2011) (chastising Justice Scalia for his “modesty” in adhering to the substantive due
process doctrine which the Justice himself believed had no basis in the Constitution’s text).
33. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34. James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths – A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 83 (2007).
35. Id.
36. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-552 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
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available to its citizens.”37 Although it was too late for the oysters,
Justice Washington upheld the law as a legitimate exercise of the State’s
power.38
Corfield’s description of the privileges and immunities of citizenship
has proven influential in the renewed scholarly debate concerning the
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 However, the Supreme Court’s decision in The
Slaughter-House Cases is an insurmountable obstacle facing anyone
desiring to reframe the discussion of substantive rights in this context.40
Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion shaped both the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment and their contemporaries’ understanding of
privileges and immunities.41 The Corfield opinion specifically identified
property ownership as one of the privileges of citizenship that the
Constitution protected.42 Had Justice Washington not felt it too tedious
to enumerate the right to “exercise [one’s] trade,” the Slaughter-House
Cases may never have happened.43 Fewer than five years after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority in The
Slaughter-House Cases, citing Justice Washington as authority,
determined that the rights described both in Article IV, §2 and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
comprised a narrow body of rights, “which owe their existence to the
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws.”44
The Slaughter-House decision upheld Louisiana’s grant of a
monopoly to its butchers against a challenge by a new company
claiming that the law violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause
because it denied them the right to “exercise their trade.”45 Under The
37. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
39. See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham
and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 333 (2011).
40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
41. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 832-834 (describing Sen. Jacob Howard’s reliance on the Corfield
opinion in his speech introducing a third draft of the Fourteenth Amendment before the Senate.
Newspapers across the country reprinted Sen. Howard’s speech, touching off widespread national
debate. Reaction among the citizenry and the subsequent congressional debates concerning the
Amendment included descriptions of “Privileges and Immunities” that echoed Sen. Howard and those
described in Corfield.). But see, Lash, supra note 39, at 334 (arguing against the conventional wisdom
of current scholars that Justice Washington’s opinion informed John Bingham’s draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
42. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
43. Slaughter - House Cases, 83 U.S. at 60 (refuting the plaintiffs’ claim that the statute
unconstitutionally denied them the privilege to “exercise their trade”).
44. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 851 (Thomas. J., concurring) (quoting Slaughter—House Cases, 83
U.S. at 79).
45. Id. (quoting Slaughter- House Cases, 83 U.S. at 60).
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Slaughter-House Cases, the privileges or immunities of federal
citizenship guarantees the right to visit Washington D.C. and “transact
any business he may have with it, . . .” enjoy protection on the high seas,
petition for habeas corpus, and become a citizen of any other state.46 For
the Slaughter-House majority, Justice Thomas’ construction would
allow the Supreme Court to act as a “perpetual censor” upon the States
and upset the balance of a federalism to a degree that neither the drafters
of the Amendment nor the States ratifying it intended.47
The effect of the Slaughter-House Cases was to create a distinct body
of state and federal privileges and immunities that were “mutually
exclusive.”48 This dichotomy proved disastrous for victims of the Colfax
massacre who lost their lives the day before the Supreme Court issued
its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases.49 The leader of a white mob
in Louisiana attacked a group of mostly black citizens, eventually
parading his prisoners through the streets and summarily executing
them.50 Louisiana only convicted three of the ninety-seven indicted
participants, not for murder, but for violating the Enforcement Act of
1870.51 This prohibited anyone from conspiring to prevent another from
enjoying any “right or privilege granted or secured to him by the
constitution or laws of the United States.”52 One of the privileges that
the defendants conspired to deny to their victims was the right to bear
arms, which the Second Amendment ostensibly secured.53
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Cruikshank, held otherwise
and declared that the Constitution did not grant the right to bear arms.54
Rather, the Second Amendment only guaranteed that Congress, and
Congress alone, would not abridge that which predated the
Constitution’s ratification.55 Ultimately, the Court reversed all of the
convictions and held that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
were not at issue because they spoke only to state actions, not those of
private individuals.56 It was the Cruikshank decision specifically that
precluded the McDonald plaintiffs’ claim that the Chicago ordinance

46. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
47. Id. at 78.
48. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 852 (Thomas. J., concurring).
49. Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1071 (2009).
50. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 808 (Thomas. J., concurring).
51. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1876).
52. Id.
53. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 809 (Thomas. J., concurring).
54. 92 U.S. at 553 (1875).
55. Id.
56. Huhn, supra note 49, at 1074.
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violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause.57 The plurality in
McDonald found it unnecessary to reconsider its interpretation of the
Clauses’ meaning under the Slaughter-House and Cruikshank precedent
because the Due Process Clause analysis was sufficient for striking
down the ordinance.58
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A. Origins
It is prudent to review conceptions of property rights that informed
the drafters of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as
those of public whose understanding is so critical to our analysis.59
Whether the right of a citizen to dispose of his private property is a
privilege of citizenship enjoying the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection depends entirely upon the substance of the right itself.
Colonial notions of private property rights trace their origins to ancient
conceptions predating Magna Carta. However, it was that document
which prominently codified those ancient conceptions and provided a
foundation for future generations of Englishmen to advance their
individual liberty interests.60 Indeed, the Fifth Amendment’s text is a
direct descendant of Magna Carta’s guarantee that “no man's lands or
goods shall be seised into the king's hands.”61
Magna Carta was influential on later English legal theory which, in
turn, influenced the Constitution’s framers. In particular, William
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in 1765,
left a lasting impact upon the framers and their notions of individual
liberty.62 In his Commentaries, Blackstone begins his discussion of
private property rights by observing that “inherent in every Englishman,
is that [right] of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land.”63 Blackstone, in concert with Magna
57. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758.
58. Id.
59. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring). The axis around which Justice
Thomas’ analysis, and proponents of public-meaning originalism generally, revolves is the public
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text at the time of its ratification.
60. Simard v. White, 383 Md. 257, 269 (2004).
61. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 12 (University of
Adelaide, ebook 2009).
62. Mark Spatz, Shame’s Revival: An Unconstitutional Regression, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 827,
835 (2002).
63. BLACKSTONE, supra note 61 at 12.
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Carta, places property rights among those that exist independent of
political authority.64 Throughout his commentary, he emphasizes the
fundamental nature of an individual’s interest in private property.65 He
specifically addresses the subject of government seizures of private
property:
Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested,
than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as
modelled by the municipal law. In this, and similar cases the
legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and
compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and
compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in
an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now
considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an
exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an
exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and
which nothing but the legislature can perform.66
The Constitution’s protections relating to private property rights
reflect the salient principles of Blackstone’s treatise.67
Equally influential during the framers’ era were the writings of John
Locke whose Second Treatise on Government similarly grounded its
treatment of property rights in principles of natural law.68 Locke
proclaimed that “[t]he great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting
into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property.”69 The profound impact of Locke’s
philosophy is evident throughout the history of the Constitution’s
drafting, particularly through the writings of James Madison, Father of
the Constitution.70 Madison observed that "being the end of government,
that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own."71 The Takings Clause itself is directly attributable

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1973).
68. Cannon v. Delaware ex rel. Sec'y of the DOT, 807 A.2d 556, 566 (Del. 2002).
69. Kirby v. N.C. DOT, 368 N.C. 847, 853 (2016) (quoting John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government 295 (London, Whitmore & Fenn et al. 1821)).
70. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution, 100
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 37 (2016).
71. Id. n.202.
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to Madison’s fervent devotion to the protection of property rights.72 The
Clause is unique in that its protections were the only ones the states did
not propose which the Bill of Rights included.73
B. Finding Unenumerated Rights in the Constitution’s Text
Although we cannot reasonably doubt that the framers and their
contemporaries understood fundamental rights to include the right to
own and dispose of property, we similarly cannot avoid the inconvenient
truth that neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment directly
addresses the issue. Where the text is lacking, disagreement inevitably
ensues when asserting that a proper interpretation of the Constitution
yields the desired protection or prohibition. Perhaps this tension is most
evident when examining the body of substantive due process
jurisprudence that has developed since the seminal Lochner v. New York
decision more than one century ago.74 Where the Court has looked
exclusively to a clause that “speaks only to ‘process’” when deciding
what rights are fundamental, there are those who suggest that the right
answer may be more easily found by asking the correct question.75 That
vocal minority instead believes the proper inquiry when extracting
unenumerated rights from the Constitution’s text is whether or not the
right is a privilege or immunity of citizenship.76
With many parallels but less visibility exists a similar discourse
concerning the application of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to
regulatory takings of private property.77 If “substantive due process” is
an egregious misnomer,78 “regulatory taking” may similarly evoke
negative reactions when it encounters a textual interpretation. As both
proponents and critics have observed, the Supreme Court has derived its
regulatory takings precedent from a clause understood to apply only to
72. AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77-78 (1998).
73. Id.
74. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court’s
inconsistent standards used to determine which rights are “fundamental” subsequent to the Lochner
decision).
75. Id. at 806. (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the substantive due process paradigm as the
proper framework for determining which rights are “fundamental”).
76. Id.
77. See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth
Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008) (describing the debate between those finding protection from regulatory
takings in the Fifth Amendment and those who believe that the Privilege or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from such takings).
78. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, A., concurring) (agreeing that the
government’s retroactive application of a statute’s prohibitions was “related to a legitimate legislative
purpose” but disagreeing that substantive due process was a legitimate doctrine to apply to the analysis).
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physical appropriations of property for the first one hundred and fifty
years of the republic’s history.79
C. Getting to Murr
On its face, the Fifth Amendment’ Takings Clause—“[N]or shall [any
person’s] private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”—is silent as to what constitutes a taking.80 To
understand Murr’s definition of taking, it is necessary to examine the
precedent upon which it relied. Modern regulatory takings jurisprudence
originated with the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.81 In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company
challenged a statute which deprived them of the right to mine under a
homeowner’s property despite the existence of that homeowner’s deed
which explicitly granted mineral rights to the company.82 The company
argued that because the deed was executed prior to the statute’s
enactment, the government denied them “previously existing rights of
property and contract.”83
In finding for the company, Justice Holmes equated the impact of the
statute with a physical taking of the land for public use.84 He based his
holding on the “general rule” that “when regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.”85 Curiously, there was no accompanying
citation to support this “general rule” nor was there any explication of
how far was “too far.” Justice Holmes later regretted the language, if not
the substance, of his opinion and feared that the decision lacked the
clarity necessary for future courts to apply a consistent standard.86 The
century subsequent to the Mahon decision has proven his fears wellfounded.87
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court
had to determine whether New York City’s Landmark Law that
prevented the owners of Grand Central Station from improving their
property was a regulatory taking.88 The city denied two separate
applications of the owners to construct an office tower on top of the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
63 (1985).
87.
88.

See generally Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Id.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Id. at 64.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
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station.89 The city had previously designated the station as a landmark,
which the owners protested, and determined that the proposed
improvements would render the landmark a mere “curiosity.”90 The
owners argued that the Landmark Law deprived them of the use of their
“air rights” and therefore constituted a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.91 The majority disagreed with the owners and
held that because the legislation did not deprive the owners of all of
their right to use of the property and because there was no impact upon
the present operations of the property, no taking had occurred.92 Without
explicit reference or repudiation of Justice Holmes’ “too far” standard,
the Penn Central court created a new test.93 Their test focused on
whether a regulation “impair[ed] the present use” of the property.94 The
majority clarified that regulations excluding owners from some, but not
all, of the use and enjoyment of their property did not reach too far so
long as they did not materially impact the present use and enjoyment of
the property.95
Commentators have criticized the Penn Central decision because of
the confusion that the majority’s test created.96 Foreshadowing the
dissent’s position in Murr, many believed that the Penn Central test lent
itself to inconsistent application because it created “vexing subsidiary
questions.”97 Others, however, have favorably viewed the malleability
of the standard that Penn Central created, which later decisions have
adapted to suit their own purposes.98 One commentator has gone so far
as to laud the approach of Penn Central and its progeny because it
allows courts to “alter property rights to some extent without any
payment to affected owners.”99
The Court again confronted the issue of whether a regulation that
89. Id. at 117. The first application proposed a fifty-five-story structure which was reduced to
fifty-three stories with the second application. Id.
90. Id. at 118.
91. Id. at 130.
92. Id. at 138.
93. Brady, supra note 3, at 54 (describing the influence of the decision’s three-part test upon
subsequent regulatory takings analysis).
94. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 135.
95. EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 64.
96. Brady, supra note 3, at 54.
97. The Penn Central test considers “’the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.’ In addition, the ‘character of the governmental action’ – for instance whether it amounts
to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’ – may be relevant in
discerning whether a taking has occurred.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
98. See generally John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
737 (2017).
99. Id. at 757.
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reduces the economic benefit of a property constitutes a taking in Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council. In Lucas, South Carolina enacted an
environmental statute which prohibited an owner of beachfront property
from developing it for commercial purposes even though he purchased
the property prior to the enactment of the statute.100 The property was
therefore worthless to the owner and he sued for compensation.101 The
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a legitimate
exercise of the state’s police power which therefore barred any claims
for compensation.102 The Court remanded the case to the South Carolina
courts with the instruction that it must determine whether the proposed
use constituted a public nuisance.103 Any finding otherwise required the
state to compensate the owner for the loss of all economic value in his
property.104 Consistent with the Penn Central decision, the Court in
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council entrenched the proposition that a
regulation amounts to a taking only when it “denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land” to the owner.105 Whereas the
Supreme Court upheld the regulation in Penn Central because it
deprived the only of only some of the property’s value, it found that the
South Carolina statute constituted a taking absent any showing of
nuisance because of the total deprivation of value.
Highlighting the difficulty finding a coherent doctrine in the Court’s
Takings Clause jurisprudence, Justice Blackmun characterized the
majority’s holding as a departure from established precedent.106
Dissenting from the majority, he chastised the court for “launching a
missile to kill a mouse.”107 His opinion characterized the majority’s rule
as “wholly arbitrary” because “a landowner whose property is
diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner whose
property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value.”108 The
Murr majority seized upon Justice Blackmun’s observation to support
their holding.109
Justice Blackmun’s criticism notwithstanding, the Lucas test remains
persuasive. The property owner in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island relied on
the Lucas test and sued Rhode Island for compensation because a
beachfront protection statute prevented him from developing his
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Murr v. Wisconsin,137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017).
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property thereby depriving him of all of its value.110 Distinct from the
owner in Lucas, Mr. Palazzolo acquired his property after the regulation
was enacted.111 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court and determined that barring claims where regulation
predated acquisition “put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”112
The Murr court later walked back this holding and incorporated this
factor into the test it developed.113 Ultimately, the Palazzolo decision
solidified the pre-Murr approach to Takings Clause claims when it
explicitly advocated for a dual analysis under the Lucas and Penn
Central tests.114 The Court affirmed the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
ruling that the owner failed to establish a claim under the Lucas test but
remanded the case, instructing the lower court to examine the claim
under Penn Central.115
D. Murr v. Wisconsin
The issue in Murr was deceptively straightforward. Did individual
owners of private real estate have a right to dispose of (sell) it?116
Wisconsin believed, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the answer was
no.117 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court approached this issue by
considering whether the regulation prohibiting the sale of the owner’s
property violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.118 The owners
acquired two adjacent parcels of land from their parents.119 Their parents
previously owned one parcel in their name (Lot E) and the other in their
business’ name (Lot F).120 Prior to the transfer, Wisconsin enacted an
environmental protection statute requiring the county in which the
parcels were located to prohibit the sale or development of separate lots
that contained less than one acre of land suitable for development.121 A
grandfather clause in this legislation excluded “substandard” lots that
were adjacent and owned separately.122 The subject parcels, each less
110. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 627.
113. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
114. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
115. Id.
116. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1939.
117. Id. at 1950.
118. Id. at 1942.
119. Id. at 1940.
120. Id.
121. Id. The statute was enacted to discourage development along the St. Croix River. The Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act required Wisconsin and Minnesota to develop plans that protected and preserved
the ecosystem.
122. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
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than one acre, therefore remained separate until deeded to the present
owners.123 Upon the transfer, unbeknownst to the owners, the statute
combined the lots into a single parcel which still contained less than one
acre of developable land.124
Ten years after acquiring what was now a single parcel, the owners
intended to sell what was formerly Lot E to fund improvements on Lot
F.125 After the local government denied their requests for variances
permitting the sale, the owners sued in Wisconsin alleging that the
ordinance deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E
because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.”126 The
state court granted a summary judgment motion for the state and
dismissed the suit, holding that the owners had many alternatives to
selling the property that afforded them the ability to use and enjoy the
property.127 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the ordinance constituted a regulatory taking violating the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.128
The majority’s analysis expounded upon established precedent and
promulgated a new three-factor test for determining whether a
regulation amounted to a taking within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.129 After applying its test to the facts at issue, the majority found
that the state courts were correct in treating the property as a single
parcel.130 Because this treatment was correct and because the property
did not lose “all economic value” as a result of a “reasonable”
regulation, the majority agreed that no taking had occurred and affirmed
the dismissal.131 Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito dissented arguing,
among other things, that the majority’s test required future courts to
make a judgment call when defining “property” thus permitting the
government to “to warp the private rights that the Takings Clause is
supposed to secure.”132
123. Id. at 1941.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1942.
129. Brady, supra note 3, at 57. The test examined: 1. the state’s treatment of the property
including its effect on “use and disposition;” 2. the physical characteristics of the property; and 3. the
impact of the ordinance upon the property’s value and whether it was beneficial to treat the parcels as a
single property.
130. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1957 (Robert, C.J., dissenting). The main dissent also took issue with the majority’s
“blending” of factors relevant to a Takings Clause analysis with those specific to the separate question
of how property is defined. something has been "taken" and the amount of "just compensation" into the
separate constitutional question of what counts as "property."
Further, the dissenters criticized the
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Justice Thomas authored a separate dissent, which is the basis of this
Article. He agreed that the main dissent was correct in its application of
existing precedent concerning regulatory takings.133 He suggested,
however, that the precedent had no basis in the text of the
Constitution.134 Recalling his concurrence in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, though performing none of the accompanying analysis, Justice
Thomas challenged the court of “reconsider” whether takings
jurisprudence should be grounded in the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.135
IV. A BETTER PATH FORWARD
Before reconsidering regulatory takings jurisprudence, we must
justify why such an undertaking is necessary. Principally, it is because
regulatory takings jurisprudence grounds its substantive analysis in a
provision that “speaks only to ‘process.’”136 Then, to accept Justice
Thomas’ challenge requires an examination of whether the “ratifying
public” in 1868 understood the right to dispose of property to be a
privilege of American citizenship. Contemporary conceptions of
property rights in Reconstruction-era America are instructive when
deciding whether the right to dispose of property is synonymous with
the right to own property. We must also confront the dilemma that
Justice Thomas faced in his McDonald opinion—even if the right to
dispose of property is a privilege of American citizenship, must
Wisconsin refrain from abridging that right in any respect or must it
simply ensure that any abridgement is imposed equally upon all
American citizens? Having addressed all these concerns, this Article
poses the correct question—did the ordinance at issue in Murr violate
the Fourteenth Amendment? Finally, this section contemplates the
implications of an affirmative answer to this question.
A. Asking the Wrong Question
When the Slaughter-House cases foreclosed finding protection for
fundamental rights in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, those seeking
to safeguard these freedoms began to force the square peg of substantive
due process into a hole which the drafters of the Amendment never
majority for including an analysis of existing regulations which had the effect of allowing a regulation
“to limit the constitutional claim at two stages.” See Brady, supra note 3, at 58.
133. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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intended it to fill.137 Although the bodies of substantive due process and
regulatory takings jurisprudence have different roots, their critical
inquiry is the same—does a clause of the Constitution addressing
procedural rights protect substantive rights?138 All of the criticisms
levied against the Court’s substantive due process precedent apply
equally well to its regulatory takings decisions. Both doctrines are
“devoid of a guiding principle”139 and “rel[y] more on ipse dixit
assertions than reasoned analysis.”140
As Justice Thomas observed in both his McDonald and Murr
opinions, the similarities between the Court’s substantive due process
and Regulatory Takings doctrines is a function of neither having any
basis in the Constitution’s text.141 For proponents of originalism and
economic liberty, this reality has proven deeply troublesome. However,
the facts of Murr illustrate perfectly why the exhaustive attempts of
justices and academics to use the square peg fail. The oxymoronic
character of substantive due process142 is also present in a doctrine that
presents the question as such—whether a statute that forces an owner to
keep his property is really a statute that takes it from him. Just as
“process” does not mean “substance,” “take” does not mean “keep.”
There is no shortage of judges and scholars continuing to assert that
“take,” in the Fifth Amendment, means something besides the
government’s physical appropriation of private property. To do so
requires an alteration of the definition of “property” as it is used in the
Fifth Amendment, from strictly physical property, to the body of rights
associated with that property, such as the right to use, enjoy, and
exclude others from it.143 Richard Epstein, undoubtedly a staunch
originalist and defender of individual and economic liberty,144 authored
perhaps the most persuasive case for regulatory takings constituting a
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.145 His principle
137. Rubin, supra note 2, at 834.
138. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (giving rise to substantive due
process); and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
139. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 812 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140. Nicole S. Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 131, 149 (2017).
141. See McDonald 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring); Murr v. Wisconsin,137 S. Ct. 1933,
1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing
“substantive due process” as an “oxymoron”).
143. Rappaport, supra note 77, at 734.
144. Michael Rappaport, Richard Epstein on "Constitutionalism, Originalism, and
Libertarianism," ORIGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013) (describing Epstein’s approach as originalism
informed by background principals of classical liberalism).
145. Rappaport, supra note 77, at 730. (Locke’s definition of property: “This makes him willing
to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss4/5

18

Brammer: Challenge Accepted: A Reconsideration of Regulatory Takings Juris

2018]

REGULATORY TAKINGS AND PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES

1317

argument is that the Framers appreciation of the “Lockean world view”
presents definitive evidence that the ambiguity of the Takings Clause
derives from the Framer’s intent to prohibit more than physical
appropriations of property.146 However, as Michael Rappaport
reluctantly observed, Epstein’s reliance on the Framers’ views “cannot
bear the weight he places upon it.”147
What Epstein does not rely heavily enough upon is the evidence of
regulatory practices in place at the time the Framers drafted the Fifth
Amendment.148 Predating the Constitution was a regulatory system
applicable to private property that the Murr court would have
recognized.149 While Epstein’s reading is plausible, the more
appropriate reading, advanced here, is that which is consistent with the
regulatory practices that the “ratifying public” employed.150 Locke’s
influence upon the Framers is undeniable, however, the question posed
would be whether that “Lockean world view” was so pervasive amongst
the “ratifying public” that the meaning of “property” as they understood
it, would be consistent with Locke’s more expansive definition.
We need not answer that question, however. Even conceding that
there remains a plausible basis for arguing that the ordinances at issue in
Murr and Lucas fell within the Fifth Amendment’s prohibitions, it
strains credulity to assert that an ordinance, which required the owner of
his property to retain title to that property, might run afoul of the
Takings Clause as both the Framers and the “ratifying public” would
have understood it. Thus, the imperative nature of Justice Thomas’
challenge.
B. How the “Ratifying Public” Understood Property Rights
As instructive as Justice Thomas’ McDonald opinion is for the Murr
inquiry, the question in Murr exceeds the scope of that presented in
McDonald. Justice Thomas specifically declined to address whether the
Privileges or Immunities Clause extended protection to unenumerated
rights.151 Whereas the Second Amendment explicitly guarantees the
reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or
have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the
general name, property.”)
146. Id. at 738.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (examining numerous colonial property regulation regimes in
place at the time of the Constitution’s drafting).
150. Rappaport, supra note 77, at 739.
151. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 854 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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right “to keep and bear arms,” the Constitution makes no such guarantee
for the right to own property. In fact, the only references to individual
property rights are the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, “[t]he mere fact that the Clause does not
expressly list the rights it protects does not render it incapable of
principled judicial application.”152 The evidence is overwhelming that
both the framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as the ratifying public during both periods, understood property
ownership to be a fundamental component of individual liberty. James
Madison went so far as to advocate that the protection of property rights
was the ultimate purpose of government itself.153 The very fact that the
Due Process Clauses prohibit government appropriation of property
without compensation is direct evidence that a right to own property
existed when the respective drafters wrote the Amendments. Such
protections were unnecessary if citizens had no exclusive claim to their
property.
C. The Correct Question
If the right to own property is a privilege of citizenship, then the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Wisconsin from abridging it. When
we pose the correct question, there is a simple and straightforward path
to the answer. Attempting to characterize a regulation as a physical act,
which is what regulatory takings advocates do, is wholly unnecessary.
Wisconsin did not evict the Murrs. Wisconsin did not send police to
seize their land or the structures upon it. Wisconsin did not attempt to
convert any of the land for public use. What Wisconsin did do was
abridge the Murrs’ substantive right to enjoy and dispose of their
property as they pleased. This abridgment is exactly what the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit.
Southern states’ abridgment of property rights was a central focus of
both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction investigated the conduct of
these states and discovered the state governments’ systematic and
widespread abuse of black citizens’ basic freedoms. An Army general
testified during the Committee’s hearings that Virginia was “extremely
reluctant to grant to the negro his civil rights - those privileges that
pertain to freedom, the protection of life, liberty, and property before the
law. . . .”154 Similarly, Mississippi’s Black Codes, enacted in 1866,
152. Id.
153. Larkin, supra note 70, at 37 n.202.
154. Paul Finkleman, The Making of a Legal Historian: Reassessing the Work of William E.
Nelson: Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of Constitutional Law, 89
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granted black citizens the right to own property but prohibited them
from “rent[ing] or leas[ing] any lands or tenements” without permission
from city or municipal government.155 Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 in response to these conditions and included a provision
guaranteeing all persons “the right purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property. . .”156
Congress recognized that later legislatures might revise the Act or
that the Supreme Court may invalidate it altogether and
constitutionalized it with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.157
To borrow from Justice Thomas’ McDonald opinion, the record is clear
that both the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and the “ratifying
public” understood personal property rights as “essential to the
preservation of liberty” and that this body of rights included the right to
dispose of personal property.158 This being true, the holdings of the
Slaughter-House Cases and Cruikshank with respect to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause are erroneous. The McDonald majority agreed with
this sentiment before inexplicably concluding that there was “no need to
reconsider” either case’s holding.159 For Justices Alito and Scalia at
least, the ends of McDonald justified the means. Their “misgivings”
about the foundations of the doctrine underlying their holding were not
enough to encourage their acceptance of Justice Thomas’ challenge even
though they acknowledged that previous repudiations of an alternative,
possibly superior, doctrine were incorrect. The McDonald court did not
agree with Chicago’s ordinance and found that they could mash the
square peg of substantive due process hard enough to make their holding
fit the round hole of the question presented.
Unfortunately for Justice Alito and the Murrs, this approach only
prevails when there is a majority of justices willing to mash the square
peg. In Murr, the dissenters tried to apply the regulatory takings doctrine
that suffers from the same defects as substantive due process.
Regulatory takings questions—whether using the “too far” standard of
Mahon, the present value test of Penn Central, or Murr’s three-factor
framework—do not yield consistent or correct answers. That is because
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1050 (2014).
155. Mississippi
Black
Code,
AN
EX-SLAVE
REMEMBERS,
http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/122/recon/code.html (last visited May 11, 2018).
156. 14 Stat. 27, 39 Cong. Ch. 31 (1866).
157. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
158. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 858 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my
view, the record makes plain that the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the ratifyingera public understood--just as the Framers of the Second Amendment did--that the right to keep and bear
arms was essential to the preservation of liberty. The record makes equally plain that they deemed this
right necessary to include in the minimum baseline of federal rights that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause established in the wake of the war over slavery.”).
159. Id. at 758 (majority opinion).
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a regulation that does not take one citizen’s property and convey it to
another citizen or the public at large is not a taking. It is something else.
If the statute seized title to the Murr’s land into the state’s hands or
transferred it to the Audubon Society, a takings inquiry would be
appropriate. What Wisconsin was actually concerned about and what the
statute at issue guarded against was the destruction of riverside
ecosystems.
The Wisconsin statute achieved its ends because it deprived the Murrs
of the ability to dispose of the property. That is the opposite of a taking.
It is, however, a violation of the Murrs’ privileges as citizens of the
United States. Wisconsin constrained the Murrs’ property rights it
combined the two parcels into a single parcel and prohibited the sale of
any fraction of that single parcel. This action is exactly what the framers
of the Constitution feared: that governments would erode essential
freedoms through legislation which changed the character of those
rights. In the context of personal property, this erosion leads to the
gradual accretion of all property into the government’s hands.
Of course, there are many legal scholars, political actors, and ordinary
citizens that believe government ownership of property is a desirable
end—extreme examples being the communist governments of the Soviet
Union, China, and Cuba that effectively prohibited any form of private
property ownership.160 There are also more familiar advocates of such
approaches. New York mayor Bill De Blasio recently remarked that
“people all over [New York City], of every background, would like to
have the city government be able to determine which building goes
where, how high it will be, who gets to live in it, what the rent will
be.”161 He further lamented that the only thing standing in the way of
this dream was “hundreds of years of history that have elevated property
rights and wealth” such that the government may not simply order
citizens to dispose of it as the government pleases.162 Fortunately for
advocates of individual liberty, there is more than history standing in
Mayor De Blasio’s way. There is the text of the Constitution prohibiting
such deprivations of freedom.
Environmental concerns motivate other proponents of government
intervention into the sphere of private property ownership as was the
160. See generally Jon Mills and Daniel R. Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative
Perspective on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1219, 1228
(comparing the history of property rights in pre-communist Cuba as well as during Castro’s rule);
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property In the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Theresa H. Wang, Trading the People’s Homes for the People’s
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case in Murr. Professor John G. Sprankling recently published an article
celebrating the erosion of the “historic foundation of American property
law.”163 For Sprankling, humanity’s impact on the planet’s environment
requires a “retool[ing]” of property rights that does not violate the
Takings Clause.164 His solution is to redefine property rights in a way
that sidesteps the Takings Clause’s prohibitions. Some new definitions
advanced are “involuntary equitable sharing” (granting new easements
when environmental impacts make it appropriate), “fiscal-noncompensation necessity” (compensation only required when it is fiscally
convenient), or “floating fee” estates (forcing a resident to move to a
government approved location).165 If Sprankling’s dream becomes a
reality, the government will be able to “evade takings liability by
enacting legislation that weakens property rights.”166
Sprankling views the Court’s regulatory takings precedent, including
its Murr decision, as a beacon of hope that signals a new era where
property rights are “more flexible and less categorical.”167 This era is
upon us because of the development of the regulatory takings doctrine
which threatens to destroy private property rights entirely. There is a
way to reverse the effects of this erosion. We must ask the correct
question when confronted with a regulation that impacts private
property. Is the right of private property ownership a privilege of
American citizenship? The answer is, undoubtedly, yes. Therefore, the
Privilege or Immunities Clause prohibits any state from abridging that
right in the absolute terms that Sprankling abhors. This inquiry nullifies
any attempts to run end-around the Takings Clause with creative
legislation that achieves the government’s desired ends, noble though
they may be.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the facts giving rise to the Murr decision are so
trivial. Whether an obscure statute in Wisconsin prohibits a family from
selling only a part of their small plot of land is a question seemingly of
little consequence to Americans generally. And if the correct question
truly was whether this statute required Wisconsin to compensate the
Murr family for its effect, then we might more easily dismiss its
significance. But the question the Court asked in Murr was not the
correct one. What Murr truly stands for is a continuation of the Supreme
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Sprankling, supra note 98, at 738.
Id.
Id. at 759-767.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 772.
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Court’s failure to identify the most insidious intrusions upon the
foundations of American citizenship. Until the Court asks the correct
question, it will never fulfill its duty as a bulwark against legislative and
executive abuse.
Justice Thomas’ cursory challenge to the Court’s analytical
framework in his Murr dissent belies the significance of the issue truly
at hand. If the Constitution protects any fundamental liberties at all, then
it must protect the right of a citizen to own property. And if the
Constitution prohibits the states from infringing upon those fundamental
liberties, then it must be because the Privileges or Immunities Clause
provides substantive protection to those liberty interests. There is a path
forward that avoids the pitfalls of regulatory takings analyses. Restoring
meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which the SlaughterHouse Cases destroyed, is that path.
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